%0 Journal Article %T Strong and Weak Ties in Employment and Crime %+ Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats (ICREA) %+ Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier (UT3) %+ Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) %+ Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE) %+ Paris School of Economics (PSE) %+ Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux (GAINS) %+ The Research Institute of Industrial Economics %A Calvó-Armengol, Antoni %A Verdier, Thierry %A Zenouc, Yves %< avec comité de lecture %@ 0047-2727 %J Journal of Public Economics %I Elsevier %V 91 %N 1-2 %P 203-233 %8 2007-02 %D 2007 %R 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.05.011 %K Social interactions %K Crime %K Labor market %K Forward-looking agents %Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceJournal articles %X This paper analyzes the interplay between social structure and information exchange in two competing activities, crime and labor. We consider a dynamic model in which individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups, referred to as dyads. There are multiple equilibria. If jobs are badly paid and/or crime is profitable, unemployment benefits have to be low enough to prevent workers for staying too long in the unemployment status because they are vulnerable to crime activities. If, instead, jobs are well paid and/or crime is not profitable, unemployment benefits have to be high enough to induce workers to stay unemployed rather to commit crime because they are less vulnerable to crime activities. Also, in segregated neighborhoods characterized by high interactions between peers, a policy only based on punishment and arrest will not be efficient in reducing crime. It has to be accompanied by other types of policies that take into account social interactions. %G English %L halshs-00754247 %U https://pjse.hal.science/halshs-00754247 %~ SHS %~ UNIV-PARIS1 %~ ENS-PARIS %~ ENPC %~ PJSE %~ UNIV-TLSE3 %~ PSE %~ CNRS %~ UNIV-LEMANS %~ EHESS %~ INRA %~ AO-ECONOMIE %~ PARISTECH %~ PSL %~ AGREENIUM %~ INRAE %~ GAINS %~ PSE-POST-PRINT %~ ENS-PSL %~ UNIV-UT3 %~ UT3-INP %~ UT3-TOULOUSEINP