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Journal Articles American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Year : 2017

Centralized Decision Making and Informed Lobbying


We address the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making subject to influence from privately informed lobbies. We focus on informative equilibria with separating differentiable contribution schedules and identify an information transmission effect under centralized structures. Such effect decreases capture and increases welfare when lobbies have "aligned preferences." The opposite effect holds for "polarized preferences." We present two examples of this framework: local public goods and customs union agreements. Finally, we compare the policy outcomes from this political economy perspective to those under a normative mechanism design approach, and extend our analysis to the discussion of pooling equilibria.

Dates and versions

hal-01631111 , version 1 (08-11-2017)



Rafael Costa Lima, Humberto Moreira, Thierry Verdier. Centralized Decision Making and Informed Lobbying. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2017, 9 (4), pp.324-355. ⟨10.1257/mic.20150253⟩. ⟨hal-01631111⟩
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