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Journal Articles Econometrica Year : 2006

Optimal use of communication resources


We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

Dates and versions

halshs-00754118 , version 1 (20-11-2012)



Olivier Gossner, Pénélope Hernández, Abraham Neyman. Optimal use of communication resources. Econometrica, 2006, 74 (6), pp.1603-1636. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x⟩. ⟨halshs-00754118⟩
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