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Journal Articles Journal of Economic Theory Year : 2006

p-Best response set

Olivier Tercieux
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Abstract

This paper introduces a notion of p-best response set (p-BR). We build on this notion in order to provide a new set-valued concept: the minimal p-best response set (p-MBR). After proving general existence results of the p-MBR, we show that it characterizes set-valued stability concepts in a dynamic with Poisson revision opportunities borrowed from Matsui and Matsuyama [An approach to equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995) 415-434.] Then, we study equilibrium selection. In particular, using our notion of p-BR, we generalize Morris et al. [p-Dominance and belief potential, Econometrica 63 (1995) 145-157.] that aimed to provide sufficient conditions under which a unique equilibrium is selected in the presence of higher order uncertainty.

Dates and versions

halshs-00754120 , version 1 (20-11-2012)

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Cite

Olivier Tercieux. p-Best response set. Journal of Economic Theory, 2006, 131 (1), pp.45-70. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.001⟩. ⟨halshs-00754120⟩
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