An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-making - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques Access content directly
Journal Articles Quantum Interaction Year : 2009

An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-making

Abstract

In this paper we explore an extension of the Type Indeterminacy model of decision-making to strategic decision-making. A 2×2 game is investigated. We first show that in a one-shot simultaneous move setting the TI-model is equivalent to the standard Bayes-Harsanyi model. We then let the game be preceded by a cheap-talk promise game. We show in an example that in the TI-model the promise stage can have an impact on the next following behavior when the standard Bayes-Harsanyi model predicts no impact whatsoever. The TI approach differs from other behavioral approaches in identifying the source of the effect of cheap-talk promises in the intrinsic indeterminacy of the players' type.
No file

Dates and versions

halshs-00754784 , version 1 (20-11-2012)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : halshs-00754784 , version 1

Cite

Jérôme Busemeyer, Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky. An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-making. Quantum Interaction, 2009, 5494, pp.113-128. ⟨halshs-00754784⟩
120 View
0 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More